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Abstract—The human self has many facets: there is the physi-
cal body and then there are different concepts or representations
supported by processes in the brain such as the ecological, social,
temporal, conceptual, and experiential self. The mechanisms of
operation and formation of the self are, however, largely un-
known. The basis is constituted by the ecological or sensorimotor
self that deals with the configuration of the body in space and
its action possibilities. This self is prereflective, prelinguistic,
and initially perhaps even largely independent of visual inputs.
Instead, somatosensory (tactile and proprioceptive) information
both before and after birth may play a key part. In this paper,
we propose that self-touch experience may be a fundamental
mechanisms to bootstrap the formation of the sensorimotor self
and perhaps even beyond. We will investigate this from the
perspectives of phenomenology, developmental psychology, and
neuroscience. In light of the evidence from fetus and infant
development, we will speculate about the possible mechanisms
that may drive the formation of first body representations
drawing on self-touch experience.
I. INTRODUCTION
Ulric Neisser distinguishes five different selves: the eco-
logical self, the interpersonal self, the extended self, the
private self, and the conceptual self [1]. All the “selves”
are, perhaps to different degrees, embodied and thus closely
related to the representations of our bodies in our brains. Also
here a number of concepts including superficial and postural
schema [2], body schema, body image, corporeal schema, etc.
have been put forth. One characteristic common to all these
representations is their multimodal nature: they dynamically
integrate information from different sensory modalities (tactile,
proprioceptive, vestibular, visual), not excluding motor infor-
mation. Somatosensory (tactile and proprioceptive) informa-
tion constitutes an important subset, perhaps most intimately
tied to the body itself. However, the concepts of body schema,
body image, and many others are umbrella notions for a range
of observed phenomena rather than a result of identification
of specific mechanisms. The field is thus in a somewhat
“chaotic state of affairs” [3]. The higher level facets of
the self—accessible to consciousness, incorporating linguistic
and visual information—have been receiving relatively more
attention. However, here we will argue that the ecological or
sensorimotor self constitutes a key foundation for the rest and
we will speculate about self-touch experience as a key enabler
that may bootstrap its formation.
II. PHILOSOPHICAL FACETS: SELF-TOUCH IN
PHENOMENOLOGY
The special nature of touch—and in particular self-touch—
has been appreciated by phenomenologists. In what follows
we draw on the treatment of Ratcliffe [4]. Both Husserl and
Merleau-Ponty investigate the situation of two hands touching
each other. Husserl [5, p. 153] notes that “the sensation is
doubled in the two parts of the Body [Leib], since each is
precisely for the other an external thing that is touching and
acting upon it, and each is at the same time Body” and points
out the duality of perceiver and perceived in this “double sen-
sation”. Merleau-Ponty provides a related account in several
places (e.g., [6], [7]) and emphasizes the “reversibility” of the
roles of perceiver and perceived. Ratcliffe [4] further argues
against this differentiation of perceiver vs. perceived.
Touch can perhaps be regarded as phenomenologically
the most primary of senses [8], [4]: Unlike vision, which
possibly—at least to some extent—allows for a detached
perception of the world, with touch this is not possible: touch
always embraces the whole continuum between perceiving
body and perceived body and “is partly constitutive of the
sense of reality and belonging, whereas other kinds of sensory
experience presuppose it” [4]. Finally, Ratcliffe [4] rightly
notes that “touch” in this context should probably not be
viewed in the narrow sense of cutaneous sensation, but should
also include proprioception (sense of position and movement
of the body)—what is embraced by somatosensation (which
we will use here to denote touch and proprioception together).
III. SELF-TOUCH IN DEVELOPMENT: FETUS AND INFANT
Not only does touch (somatosensation, more precisely)
have a certain “phenomenological primacy”, but it is also
the first sense to emerge in the fetus [9]. Furthermore, it is
frequently stimulated: fetuses are constantly touched by their
environment (amniotic fluid, uterine surface, placenta, cord)
and also engage in self-touch. They perform local movements
directed to areas of the body most sensitive to touch: the face
(the mouth in particular), but also for example soles of feet
[10, p. 113-114]. Later, from 26 to 28 weeks (of gestational
age), they also use the back of the hands to touch as well
as touch other body areas like thighs, legs, and knees [10,
p. 29-30]. In addition, from 19 weeks, fetuses anticipate
the hand-to-mouth movements [11] (the mouth opens prior
to contact) and from 22 weeks, the movements seem to show
the recognizable form of intentional actions, with kinematic
patterns that depend on the goal of the action (toward mouth
vs. toward eyes) [12]. Next to local movements toward the
body and the somatosensory stimulation induced, Piontelli [10,
p. 115] further speculates that “turbulent general movements,
with their often complete rotations (especially during the early
stages of pregnancy), probably endow fetuses with a sense of
their bodies in space.” Here, vestibular inputs may complement
the information from touch and proprioception.
Birth obviously brings about a major disruption of the
equilibrium that was reached in the womb: the constrained
aquatic environment is suddenly replaced by an aerial one,
with gravity playing a major part. Nevertheless, hand-mouth
coordination continues to develop after birth (e.g., [13]). Also,
Thomas et al. [14], biweekly recording resting alert infants
from birth to 6 months of age, show that infants do frequently
touch their bodies, with a rostro-caudal progression as they
grow older: Head and trunk contacts are more frequent in the
beginning, followed by more caudal body locations including
hips, then legs, and eventually the feet. Rochat [15], [16]
also discusses a “two-month revolution”: the emergence of a
more contemplative stance taken by infants in their attention
to events and things, correlated with a sudden increase in the
time the infant spends awake and alert [17].
In order to gain some insight into how much “functional
body knowledge” the infants have at different ages, Lockman
et al. invented an experimental paradigm whereby vibrating
stimuli (buzzers) are attached to different body parts and the
infant’s responses—e.g., movement of a stimulated body part
or reaching action toward the buzzer—are observed [18], [19],
[20]. The results indicate that there is dramatic development
in particular in the period between 3 and 8 months of age.
IV. SELF-TOUCH AND THE BRAIN
The development of brain circuits is obviously another
key determinant of the construction of the “self” in the
fetus, infant, and child. Tau and Peterson [21] provide an
excellent survey of the processes and their timing in this period
(neural proliferation and migration, apoptosis, synaptogenesis,
and myelination). Relating specifically to the processing of
somatosensation, around 18-22 weeks, neurons receiving pre-
liminary afferent inputs from the somatosensory thalamus are
located on the subplate (a transient embryonic cortical layer).
Synaptic connections here serve as placeholders ahead of later
connections for thalamocortical neurons [21] (for more details
on these see [22]). Milh et al. [23] show in premature neonates
that spontaneous movements give rise to stimulation in the
somatosensory cortex in a somatotopic manner.
The early period after birth represents a time of dramatic
change in brain structure and function. Next to massive overall
growth of brain volume, the perinatal and postnatal brain
development features also the onset of myelination and striking
development (but also pruning) of gray matter connections,
especially in the sensorimotor and visual cortices [21]. Ex-
perience (or activity-dependent factors) starts playing a more
prominent function in the shaping of neural circuitry [24], [21].
While primary cortical areas (including motor, somatosensory,
visual, and auditory cortices) can be identified, association
cortices are less clearly delineated in the newborn brain [21].
Around 2 months of age, there is a transition from the
dominant control of behaviors by subcortical systems to higher
order cortical systems [25]. PET imaging studies suggest that
subcortical regions and the sensorimotor cortex are the most
metabolically active brain regions in neonates younger than 5
weeks; by 3 months of age, metabolic activity then increases
in parietal, temporal, and dorsolateral occipital cortices [26],
[27]. These facts may be in line with (or even bring about)
the “two-month revolution” in infant behavior reported above.
All the above mentioned facts suggest that already the
prenatal brain should be able to perceive stimulations arising
from events pertaining to the body and its configuration.
Higher-level or multimodal representations may possibly form
somewhat later in the course of the first year after birth, as
these are thought to reside in association cortices (in particular
posterior parietal areas). It is unclear whether the self-touch
events play a special part in the “learning of a body model”.
Interestingly, albeit in adult monkey brain, Sakata et al. [28]
found neurons in area 5 of the parietal cortex that responded
specifically to self-touch: “’matching neurons’, because the
’best’ stimulus for them was to bring a part of a limb in
contact with a part of another limb or the trunk, as if to match
two body regions to each other.” The response was elicited
only in specific body configurations (as perceived through
proprioceptive afference) and only if the corresponding tactile
stimulation was present.
V. MECHANISMS OF LEARNING A BODY MODEL FROM
SELF-TOUCH
Perhaps the redundant information induced by the self-touch
configurations in the proprioceptive-tactile space (or motor-
proprioceptive-tactile-visual if the whole system is considered
and the body part is visible) may facilitate learning about the
body in space. Rochat [29] writes: “By 2-3 months, infants
engage in exploration of their own body as it moves and
acts in the environment. They babble and touch their own
body, attracted and actively involved in investigating the rich
intermodal redundancies, temporal contingencies, and spatial
congruence of self-perception.” In Piaget’s view, in this period
(from birth to about 9 months), “as yet, no constant relation
exists between visual and buccal space or between tactile
and visual space. True, auditory and visual space are already
coordinated, as are buccal and tactile space, but no total
and abstract space encompasses all the others.” Then, Piaget
proposes prehension (grasping) as a key enabler to connect
visual space to tactile and gustatory space [30].
Neither the mechanisms of this developmental process nor
the operation of the body models are clear. Below we first
discuss the relationship between reaching to external (visual)
targets and reaching to own body. Then we review the mathe-
matical treatment of inferring the dimensionality of space (or
body in space) from sensorimotor contingencies. Finally, we
review robotic models thereof.
A. Reaching to visual targets vs. reaching to the body
Goal-directed reaching begins to develop only slightly later
than multisensory processing, at roughly 5 months of age.
While a full account is out of the scope of this paper, we want
to point out the implications on reaching to one’s own body. As
reviewed in [31] for example, researchers initially concentrated
on the role of vision in guiding the arm toward a target object.
Since the late 1990s they have started investigating reaching as
the product of multiple interacting subsystems, with important
parts played by the motor system, proprioception, and the
whole embodiment and dynamics of the infant in general (e.g.,
[32], [33]). Localizing targets on the own body is special in
two respects: (i) the body that is used to act on the environment
itself becomes a target; (ii) for certain targets, the process
bypasses vision. More precisely, it has to do so in the case of
non-visible targets like on the face; and it may do so with other
targets, relying on somatosensory information only. While both
types of encoding—visual (sometimes called extrinsic) as well
as postural (intrinsic)—were found in different regions in the
parietal cortex (e.g., [34]), the developmental trajectory is
unclear. In particular, does reaching for somatosensory targets
on the body develop first and separately from reaching to
visual targets in external peripersonal space? How do these
systems interact and what do they share? Heed et al. [35]
provide a survey of possible architectures that could support
the remapping needed for action towards a tactile stimulus
(from skin-based to external reference frame). In adults, co-
ordinates drawing on vision (eye-centered or gaze-centered)
seem to be involved even when processing targets on the
body [36], [37]. However, considering that vision continues
to develop in early infancy, it is also possible to think that
localization of the body in space may first be established
relying on somatosensory inputs, and this representation may
later be shaped or overridden by a vision-based encoding.
B. Inferring the body in 3D space from self-touch
One particular theoretical problem is extracting the dimen-
sionality of external space (which is 3-dimensional) without
prior knowledge from high-dimensional multimodal sensory
or sensory-motor data. Work on this topic goes back to
Poincare´ [38] who showed that an arm with n degrees of
freedom equipped with encoders and with the end-effector
fixed in space can through movement infer the dimension-
ality of external space from the real dimensionality of the
proprioceptive signal spaces (as it moves in the joint space,
keeping the end-effector fixed). This was followed up more
recently by considering active agents collecting sensorimotor
experience [39], [40], [41]. Roschin et al. [42] proposed a
model specifically addressing a self-touch scenario, fusing
tactile and proprioceptive information.
C. Embodied brain models and self-touching robots
The models reviewed in the previous section have a the-
oretical nature and speak mostly to the question of whether
extracting 3D space and a spatial representation of the body
in this space is theoretically possible. However, they do not
imply that these mechanisms are used by biological organisms
and their neural systems. To this end, embodied brain models
are necessary. Yamada, Kuniyoshi et al. have addressed fetal
development, including touch and the formation of somatosen-
sory representations, in a series of fetal simulators coupled
with brain models, culminating in [43]. We have pursued a
similar approach targeting early postnatal development in the
iCub humanoid robot: representations of the tactile space [44]
and a preliminary attempt toward a proprioceptive represen-
tation [45] were learned in a bottom-up fashion using self-
organizing maps. The next steps will involve connecting these
modalities using self-touch (already implemented in the robot
relying thus far on engineered modules [46]).
VI. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
The treatment of self-touch by phenomenologists suggests
a special role that these events may play in the formation of
the different types of the self, including the experiential self.
In the rest of the paper, we focused on the sensorimotor self
only though. The redundant information induced by self-touch
configurations in the proprioceptive-tactile space (or motor-
proprioceptive-tactile-visual if the whole system is considered
and the body part is visible) should suffice to facilitate learning
about the body in space. Furthermore, as the self-touch (or
double-touch) configurations are unique—with tactile stimu-
lation on two different body parts and only in specific joint
configurations—they might constitute a “contingent stimulus”,
associated with a reward or neuromodulation that bootstraps
learning. Observations of fetal and infant behavior (Section III)
evidence frequent spontaneous self-touch events both before
and after birth. In Section IV, we reviewed some of the
facts about the readiness of the sensory and nervous system
to process self-touch at different periods of development.
Putting this together, we speculate that self-touch experience
in the womb probably contributes to the formation of primary
somatosensory representations. The anticipation of hand-to-
mouth movements indicates also first instances of body models
that span multiple modalities. However, the formation of
more holistic multimodal representations of the body in space
occurs probably only after birth, in particular from about 2-3
months. The evidence supporting this claim includes: (i) the
perinatal period involves dramatic changes to the body itself,
the environment it is in, and brain development, which makes
a “transfer” of a body model unlikely; (ii) the representations
of the body in space are believed to reside in the association
areas of posterior parietal cortex, which are developing mostly
after birth and later than unimodal areas; (iii) cortical control
of movement is also taking over from around 2 months
after birth. This hypothesis is in line with our observations
when attaching buzzers to infant body parts, whereby there is
dramatic development in particular in the period between 3
and 8 months of age [18], [19], [20]. Finally, computational
models corroborate the possibility that a model of the body
in space can be extracted from somatosensory (or motor-
somatosensory) information only. Embodied brain and robotic
models make it possible to further ground the computational
models and put the hypotheses proposed here to test.
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